Fort Dix Chapter VI - Demobilization
Chapter VI
CAMP DIX AND DEMOBILIZATION
“The collapse of the Central Powers
came more quickly than even the best-informed military experts believed
possible.” 1 (U.S. Secretary of War 1tr. To U.S. Senator James A. Reed, 3 April
1919.)
Thus, wrote Secretary of War Newton
D. Baker in a letter to Senator James A. Reed about the suddenness of the
armistice on 11 November 1918. The abrupt end of the war found the United
States even less prepared for demobilization than it had been for mobilization
in April 1917.
When the war ended, there was only one
officer, Colonel C. H. Conrad, Jr. in the entire United States Army actively
working on plans for personnel demobilization, and he had received the
assignment only one month previously.
General Peyton C. March, chief of
staff, US Army, in speaking of the planning for demobilization said, “…There
were no precedents afforded by the experience of our former wars which were of
value in determining policy.” 2 (Peyton C. March, The Nation at War, p. 312)
Except the Civil War, no war in
which the United States previously participated had involved the mass of
personnel comparable to the millions who served in World War I. Then, too, the
opportunities of economic and territorial expansion in the nation that existed
after the Civil War were not available to the men released in 1918-19.
The War Department planners
considered the welfare of the nation as well as the Army and concluded that
demobilizing the emergency troops could be best accomplished in one of four
ways: soldiers could be separated by length of service, by industrial needs or
occupation, by locality (through the use of local draft boards), or by military
units.
The decision favoring the military
unit method of demobilization was made on 16 November 1918 and immediately
announced to the press. The secretary of war, describing the plan in his report
for 1919, said, ‘…the policy adopted was to demobilize by complete
organizations as their services could be spared, thus insuring the maximum
efficiency of those organizations remaining, instead of demobilizing by special
classes with the resulting discontent among those not given preferential
treatment and retained in the service, thus lowering their morale and
efficiency and disrupting all organizations with the attendant general
discontent,’ 3 (U.S. Secretary of War, War Department Annual Report 1919, vol.
I, pt. I, p. 14)
Demobilization Centers, such as Camp
Dix became on 3 December 1918, performed the task of discharging the troops. At
these centers camp personnel conducted physical examinations, made up the
necessary papers to close all records, checked property, adjusted financial and
other accounts, and generally completed the processing. Many units in the
United States were not immediately released. They manned ports of embarkation,
convalescent and demobilization centers, supply depots, base and general
hospitals, garrisons along the Mexican border, and bases outside the United
States.
Camp Dix personnel had a taste of
the inactivation process even before it was designated a Demobilization Center.
This occurred on 30 November 1918 with the official inactivation of the 102nd Infantry
Division, the new division scheduled for formation at Camp Dix that never got
beyond assignment of cadre. In December 1918 demobilization got underway in
earnest with the inactivation of the 333rd, 334th, 338th, 339th, and 346th Light
Tank Battalions; the 351st 382nd, 383rd Heavy Training and
Replacement Companies; and the 319th,,320th,321st Tank Repair and Salvage
Companies. These tank units were elements of the 309th and 310th Tank
Centers, which only had been transferred to Camp Dix in November 1918. They
were part of the final war plan to augment tank participation of the A.E.F. in
France during the scheduled 1919 buildup of United States forces. Although
these organizations had received cadres of some trainees, systematic training
barely began before the units were inactivated. The two Tank Center
Headquarters remained at Camp Dix for a time, but they, too, were inactivated
in June 1919.
Demobilization really got underway
at Camp Dix beginning in January 1919. In quick succession, seven entire
infantry divisions or their major elements were inactivated in the next six
months. They were the 87th Infantry Division, January to March; 41st Infantry
Division, February to March; 28th Infantry Division, April to May; 42nd Infantry
Division, May; 29th Infantry Division, May; 78th Infantry Division,
the first occupants of Camp Dix, May to June; and the 79th Infantry
Division, May to June.
During the same period, inactivation
of the following smaller units was accomplished at Camp Dix; 10 engineer
regiments, two engineer trains, 26 transportation corps companies, three
pioneer infantry regiments, one infantry brigade headquarters, six machine gun
battalions, 30 base hospitals, four military police companies, two butchery
companies, eight sales commissary units, and 14 U.S. guards battalions.
More than 300,000 men were
discharged at Camp Dix by 31 July 1919. Of this number 16,485 were officers and
39 field clerks (similar to today’s warrant officer). In addition, 76,124
officers and men were transferred to other stations for reassignment or further
processing prior to discharge. The largest number of discharges for a day was
5, 231 and transfers 4, 617.
Although the size and number of
units inactivated during the period 1 July to 31 December 1919 began to fall
off, the scale of inactivations continued to be significant. They included:
nine engineer regiments, 63 transportation corps companies, two pioneer
infantry regimens, six base hospitals, five ambulance service sections, 25
military police companies, 13 butchery companies, and eight sales commissary
units. By October 1919, the demobilization requirements at Camp Dix had slowed
to a point where no more than 500 men were handled per day. The War Department
already had acquiesced in the requirement that a man be discharged within 48
hours of his arrival at the center.
It was in October that Camp Dix was
chosen by the Treasury Department to be the site for filming of movies in
support of the “Fifth Liberty Loan Drive.” More than $100,000 was invested in
filming simulated battles with doughboys dressed in German battle dress.
Scenes took place in the mock trench
area near the filtration plant at New Jersey Avenue beyond 8th Street. The
trench area, which circled eastward toward Pointville and included heavily
wooded terrain, afforded an ideal setting for producing battle scenes
reminiscent of those fought on the Western Front.
By the end of January 1920,
demobilization at Camp Dix had come to an end.
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